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Will the Independent Director Institution
Work in China?
SIBAO SHEN * AND JING JIA
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, China has joined the corporate governance
debate and introduced the independent director institution to
improve the corporate governance of listed corporations On
August 6, 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) issued the Guiding Opinion on Establishing the
Independent Director Institution in Listed Corporations ("the
Opinion").2 This landmark document formally established the
independent director institution in China under which a minimum
of one-third of each listed corporation's board members shall be
independent directors.' Despite insufficient practical and
theoretical bases, many people-including the regulators-hope
the independent director institution will be a panacea to the
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1. See Minkang Gu, Will an Independent Director Institution Perform Better than a
Supervisor? Comments on the Newly Created Independent Director System in the People's
Republic of China, 6 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 59, 59 (2003) (surveying independent director
theory in Chinese corporate governance).
2. See CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMM'N, GUIDELINES FOR INTRODUCING
INDEP. DIRS. TO THE BD. OF DIRS. OF LISTED COS., Zhengjianfa No. 102 (2001), available
at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1061947864100&type=CMS.STD
[hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR INTRODUCING DIRECTORS].
3. Id.
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corporate governance problems entangling Chinese listed
corporations.4
The concept of independent director carries no clear meaning,
even among its proponents Several terms, such as independent
director, outside director, and non-executive director, are used
interchangeably, though the terms have different meanings.
Outside directors and non-executive directors are similar in that
they are not involved in the day-to-day operations of a
corporation. Neither position, however, guarantees independence.
Some individuals appear to be outsiders, but are in fact insiders,
such as former employees, outside counsel providing financial or
legal services, or close families of senior management members.6
In terms of their relationship with management or controlling
shareholders, outside directors further divide into affiliated
directors and unaffiliated directors.7 Only the unaffiliated, outside
directors are independent directors.8 In China, an independent
director does not assume any position other than director in a
corporation, and who has no relationship with the corporation or
its controlling shareholders that might affect his or her
independent, objective judgment.9
Independent directors first appeared in the United States to
cure the corporate governance problems of public corporations,
which have widely dispersed shareholders. ° Independent directors
were created to monitor the integrity and performance of
management in order to make public corporations a more effective
wealth-maximizing instrument for shareholders, and a more
socially responsible instrument for the public." The rationale
behind the independent director institution in China differs from
4. Gu, supra note 1, at 59.
5. Victor Brudney, The Independent Director - Heavenly City Or Potemkin Village?,
95 HARv. L. REV. 597, 599 (1982) (arguing for the importance of regulatory controls in
corporate governance in view of the inadequacy of "independent directors.").
6. See BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS: GOVERNANCE &
REGULATION, § 2:26 (2d ed. 2004); see also Donald E. Pease, Outside Directors: Their
Importance to the Corporation and Protection from Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 25, 29
(1987).
7. OLSON, supra note 6.
8. See id.
9. Tong Lu, Development of System of Independent Directors and the Chinese
Experience, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM: CHINA AND WORLD (2002),
available at Ctr for Int'l Private Enter., http://www.cipe.org/china/cg-book.htm.
10. See Betty M. Ho, Restructuring the Boards of Directors of Public Companies in
Hong Kong: Barking Up the Wrong Tree, 1 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 507, 507 (1997).
11. Brudney, supra note 5, at 602.
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that in the United States: the institution in China primarily targets
controlling shareholders, rather than management. 12 Instead of
dispersed share ownership, the ownership structure of listed
corporations in China is highly concentrated. 3 The major
corporate governance problem is that controlling shareholders use
their advantageous positions to expropriate the assets of listed
corporations to the detriment of minority shareholders.
14
Therefore, the introduction of the independent director institution
into China reflects the spirit of the U.S. independent director
institution-its purpose is to prevent controlling shareholders from
using their advantageous positions to the detriment of both the
corporation and of minority shareholders. 5
This Article argues that the importation of the independent
director institution to China is an important step toward improving
corporate governance. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic to count on
independent directors to completely prevent exploitation by
controlling shareholders and management, especially when listed
corporations have not yet solved their share structuring problems,
and China has yet to formulate a sound legal environment. Under
these circumstances, the independent director institution in China
cannot avoid the same defects existing in the independent director
institution in the United States--namely, an inability to monitor
and a lack of independence and incentive to remain objective.
6
Even in the United States, where the legal and social environment
is far better for independent directors to function properly, the
effectiveness of the independent director institution is highly
disputed. 7 Thus, it is doubtful whether independent directors can
meet their expectations in China.
This Article discusses the defects of the independent director
institution and provides some suggestions for its improvement in
China. Particularly, this Article discusses whether and how
independent directors and the supervisory board can co-exist in
China's corporate governance structure. China, with civil law
12. See Gu, supra note 1, at 60.
13. See id.
14. See Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then and
Now, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27, 36-37 (2002).
15. See Gu, supra note 1, at 70; see also Danhan Huang, Problems Concerning
Independent Directors Institution and Its Legal Environment, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REFORM: CHINA AND WORLD (2002), available at Ctr for Int'l Private
Enter., http://www.cipe.org/china/cg__book.htm.
16. See Ho, supra note 10, at 518-21.
17. See id. at 518.
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traditions, has a similar model to that of civil law countries where a
supervisory board is established in corporate governance law.' 8
Because of many drawbacks, the supervisory board institution
does not function well in China. 9 Since both supervisors and
independent directors serve as monitors, the functions of
independent directors and supervisors overlap. 20 Some critics argue
that it is more cost-effective for a corporation to choose between
the two institutions.2 ' This Article, however, suggests that the
supervisory board institution, after improving its power and
structure, would be a good supplementary institution to alleviate
the defects of the independent director institution.
Part I briefly outlines the debates in the United States on
independent directors. Part II analyzes their importation into
China. Part III discusses the defects of the independent director
institution and provides suggestions to improve the institution in
China. Part IV discusses the issue of co-existence of independent
directors and the supervisory board in China's corporate
governance structure. Part V concludes that the independent
director institution is only one among many measures China needs
to take in order to improve the corporate governance of its listed
corporations.
II. AMERICAN DEBATE
The concept of the independent director was first seen in the
United States in the early 20th century.22 The U.S. economy is
characterized by highly developed capital markets, which has led
to highly decentralized share ownership.23  The dispersed
shareholding structure weakens the control that the shareholders
maintain over the board of directors and management.24 Due to
this dispersed shareholding structure, with the consequence of
divorce between ownership and control, the inherent agency
problems in the corporate context are highlighted: managers of
corporations were "tempted to shirk and to steal, '[consuming]
18. See Gu, supra note 1, at 74.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 74-75.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 61.
23. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 127, 135 (1933) (observing that the corporate mechanism has
evolved into one where there are many shareholders).
24. Lu, supra note 9.
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excess leisure, perquisites and in general [being] less dedicated to
the goal of wealth maximization than they would be if they were
not simply agents.' 25 Under these circumstances, independent
directors ensure that the board of directors functions as a faithful
delegate of the shareholders; independent directors also perform
two major monitoring functions: "goad managers to perform
adequately their wealth-maximizing task, in both long-run and
short-run terms; and ...ensure managers' integrity in dividing
corporate assets between themselves and stockholders., 26 The
addition of independent directors to corporate boards is also
expected to solve the problem of corporate social responsibility,
although scholars have never agreed on how much social
responsibility is sufficient.27
The independent director institution has been accepted within
a surprisingly short time in the United States, particularly after the
1970s, in response to the increasing criticism of the evils attributed
to the exercise of unbridled corporate power uncovered in the
Watergate investigation and foreign bribery cases. Although
neither state law nor federal law makes any provision for the
composition of the board (except that the Investment Corporation
Act requires that no more than 60% of the directors of a
registered investment corporation be "interested persons"), the
independent director institution is firmly followed in practice.29
The U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has actively
promoted the structuring of corporate governance in order to
forestall the abuse of power by major corporations. As early as
1977, with the SEC's approval, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) introduced a stipulation that all listed corporations
establish and maintain an auditing committee composed entirely
of independent directors.3 ° In 2002, in response to the well-
published corporate scandals, the NYSE tightened its listing
standards to require that each listed corporation have a majority of
25. Ho, supra note 10, at 508-09 (quoting Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (1982)).
26. Brudney, supra note 5, at 602.
27. Id. at 605.
28. See id.; see also Richard Guo, Disinterested? Or Uninterested? Some Thoughts on
the CSRC's Independent Directors Guiding Opinion, CHINA L. & PRAC., Oct. 2001, at 71,
reprinted in 3 PERSP. 5 (2002), at http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives/law.htm (June 30,
2002).
29. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01 (Proposed Final Draft 1992) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
30. Lu, supra note 9.
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independent directors and three committees-nomination,
compensation, and audit-composed exclusively of independent
directors.3" The National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) has similar changes in its
listing rules.32 The American Law Institute also recommends that
"the board of every large publicly held corporation should have a
majority of directors who are free of any significant relationship
with the corporation's senior executives. Today, most U.S.
public corporation boards consist of a majority of independent
directors, and an increasing number have only one or two inside
directors .34
Despite its wide acceptance, whether independent directors
improve the corporate governance of U.S. public corporations is
disputed.35 Some commentators argue that independent directors
have played important roles in improving corporate governance.3 6
For example, a 1998 study of 154 U.S. public corporations
discovered that corporations with an active and independent board
of directors were more successful in business than those
corporations with a passive board of directors that lacked
independence.37 Another study, conducted in 2000, showed that
corporations whose board contained a high percentage of
independent directors were relatively more comprehensive in
financial disclosure.38
Other commentators, however, have raised questions about
the effectiveness of independent directors: a study of independent
special litigation committees, for example, found that almost all
special litigation committees ruled in favor of defendant-directors
and concluded that this could only have been attributed to the bias
of the independent directors.3 9 Empirical research on independent
directors of 934 American public corporations from 1983 to 1993-
31. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 1:195 (2d ed. 2004).
32. Id.
33. PRINCIPLES, supra note 29, at § 3A.01.
34. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 232 (2002).
35. Lu, supra note 9.
36. Id.; see Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Largest Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1298
(1998).
37. Lu, supra note 9.
38. Id.
39. Ho, supra note 10, at 523.
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including such names as General Motors, IBM, Kodak, Chrysler,
and Westinghouse-concluded that large, American, public
corporations could not improve their corporate governance
efficiency and raise their performance by absorbing an increasing
number of independent directors.4 ° A recent 2002 empirical study
revealed that low profitability corporations responded by
increasing the independence of boards; however, corporations with
more independent boards often did not improve profitability, and
there was some indication that these companies performed
worse. 41 In every recent headlining boardroom scandal, beginning
with Texas Gulf Sulfur, there was a preponderance of outsiders on
the board at the time of the scandal.42 For example, the
inside/outside balance was two to ten at Texas Gulf Sulfur (insider
trading violation), five to twelve at Lockheed (illegal political
contributions), four to eighteen at Penn Central (financial
disaster), three to six at Northrup, six to eleven at W.T. Grant
(bankruptcy), three to nine at Gulf Oil (both involving bribes to
foreign officials), and two to fifteen at Enron (accounting
irregularities) .43
There have been several criticisms of the independent
director institution. First, critics claim that independence does not
really exist because management has significant control over
selection of independent directors, and independent directors are
not socially independent no matter how tight the criteria for
independence. Second, independent directors do not possess
adequate incentive to actively monitor management because they
do not have a genuine interest in the corporation. Finally, even
truly independent and diligent directors lack information and
resources to effectively monitor management.
Therefore, despite the wide acceptance of the independent
director institution in the United States, many critics remain
unconvinced and have presented persuasive arguments that the
institution contains insurmountable defects, and may even be
futile. If independent directors are not effective directors, why are
they so well-accepted among U.S. public corporations? As some
critics point out, one reason is, ironically, insiders of public
corporations welcome independent directors because they shield
40. Lu, supra note 9.
41. Bhagat & Black, supra note 34, at 233.
42. OLSON, supra note 6, at § 2:26.
43. See id.
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management from the aura of impartiality and legal liability. 44 For
example, the board can often prevent a shareholder's derivative
action by appointing a "disinterested" committee.45 The committee
is supposed to determine whether continuing the action is in the
corporation's "best interests," which, not surprisingly, rarely
occurs.46 The American Bar Association also counsels that a
nominating committee is good for self-protection: "The existence
of a properly constituted Nominating Committee should be an
important factor in securing judicial acceptance of the overall
fairness of the decision-making process.,
47
III. IMPORTATION TO CHINA
A. Following the Trend
Not until the early 1990s did developed countries other than
the United States, e.g., Canada, the United Kingdom, and
Australia, begin to lay down detailed provisions on the ratio,
48
credentials, roles, and responsibilities of independent directors.
The trend of establishing the independent director institution
spread to developing countries in the late 1990s. 49 The Asian
financial crisis gave developing countries, especially Asian
emerging-market countries, a lesson on the importance of a sound
corporate governance system. India, Malaysia, Thailand, Korea,
Philippines, Singapore, and Mexico all made stipulations
concerning independent directors on the board of directors of
listed companies within several years. ° China also followed this
trend.
The concept of the independent director appeared, for the
first time, in the Guiding Opinion for Listed Corporations'
Articles of Incorporation issued by the CSRC in December 1997.
It suggests that listed corporations may retain independent
directors at their option. The 1993 Corporation Law of China does
not specially address independent directors. Before the CSRS's
Guiding Opinion was published, provisions concerning
44. See Pease, supra note 6, at 35-40.
45. OLSON, supra note 6, at § 2:26.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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independent directors were scattered in various rules and
regulations. The Guiding Opinion for Governance of Listed
Corporations, issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange on
November 3, 2000, suggests that there should be at least two
independent directors, and the number of independent directors
should account for at least 20% of the entire board membership.
On August 6, 2001, the CSRC issued the Opinion, requiring
each listed corporation to have at least one third of its board
comprised of independent directors prior to June 30, 2002. Of
these independent directors, at least one must be an accounting
professional. The Opinion assigns more powers to independent
directors than regular directors. Independent directors have the
right to, among other things, approve or disapprove of any major
conflict of interest transactions, make recommendations to hire or
dismiss auditors, hold board meetings, and request that the board
hold interim shareholders' meetings. Independent directors shall
also provide their opinions regarding the following important
matters: nomination, appointment, and dismissal of directors and
senior executives; compensation of directors and senior executives;
and any large loans. To exercise their powers, independent
directors can independently retain outside counsel, such as
auditors and lawyers.
Chinese regulators have high expectations for the
independent director institution to resolve the corporate
governance problems which have entangled the listed corporations
since corporation reform began in the early 1990s. The regulators,
particularly the CSRC, have hailed the establishment of the
independent director institution as a key step towards improving
corporation governance. In February 2004, the State Council of
China issued "Some Opinions on Promoting the Reform, Opening
and Steady Growth of the Capital Market."51 This document
strengthens the importance of independent directors in the reform
and development of China's capital market.
B. Roles of Independent Directors in Corporate Governance
The shareholding structures of China's listed corporations are
far different from the ones in the United States. Instead of
dispersed shareholding, the shareholdings of Chinese listed
51. See Liu Dongkai, Capital Market Reform Touches Hard Core of China's
Economic System, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 3, 2004, available at 2004 WL 68250769.
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corporations are highly concentrated.12 The state or state-owned
enterprises hold significant percentages of shares of most listed
corporations.53 According to one study, the largest shareholding
stake in listed corporations average close to 50% compared to the
second largest shareholder, who typically owns less than 10%.14 As
may be expected, controlling shareholders dominate the board.
Typically, controlling shareholders appoint 70% of the directors.55
Controlling shareholders also select management, which highly
overlaps the board. This governance structure facilitates self-
dealing transactions by enabling controlling shareholders to
manipulate the shareholders' general meeting and the board at the
expense of the interests of the corporation and minority
shareholders.56
Since the major corporate governance problem of Chinese
listed corporations resides with controlling shareholders, the
establishment of the independent director institution primarily
targets controlling shareholders, rather than management.5 7 In the
United States, management controls the board, while in China, the
controlling shareholders control the board. So the establishment of
the independent director institution in China aims to prevent
controlling shareholders from exploiting their control to cause
detriment to the corporation and its minority shareholders. The
Opinion has made it clear that independent directors should
conscientiously perform their duties according to relevant laws and
regulations. The Opinion and the articles of incorporation protect
the whole interests of the corporation, and give special attention to
ensure that the legitimate rights and interests of medium-sized and
small investors are not harmed.
A less important role of independent directors in China is to
monitor management integrity and performance. Despite the fact
that controlling shareholders dominate the board, the problem
with the divorce of management from shareholders still prevails in
52. See Linan Yan, Corporate Governance Under Chinese Law: Problems and
Prospects, 7 HARV. ASIA Q. (2003), available at http://www.fas.harvard.edu/-asiactr/
haq/200302/index.htm.
53. See Huang, supra note 15.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. For example, one listed corporation purchased from an affiliated corporation of
the controlling shareholder more raw materials than what it could use for the next several
hundred years. Schipani & Liu, supra note 14, at 47.
57. See Gu, supra note 1, at 60.
58. See id. at 71.
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China.5 9 One characteristic of Chinese corporate governance is
that the controlling shareholders of most listed corporations are
either state or state-owned enterprises.60 It is impossible for the
state to pay proper attention to the operations of such a large
amount of state-owned enterprises. The officials delegated to run
these corporations often take advantage of the vacuum of
ownership in order to make dirty money.
Therefore, in China, independent directors primarily play two
monitoring functions: (1) preventing controlling shareholders
from taking advantage of their controlling position to do things
detrimental to minority shareholders, and (2) bringing
management under independent supervision to alleviate "insider"61 • ..
problems. Xiangbin Yin, an independent director of a Chinese
listed corporation, describes his experiences: the State-the
largest shareholder-expects him to be a "KGB" in the
corporation, i.e., to ensure the integrity of the executives, while the
individual minority shareholders expect him to be a "white
knight," i.e., to fight against the exploitation from the controlling
shareholder and from insiders. 62 It is interesting that a state-owned
enterprise based in Shenyang has appointed a deputy director of
the Anti-Corruption Bureau of the District Prosecutor as its
independent director.63 It is said that the Anti-Corruption Bureau
is an institution devised by the District Prosecutor to prevent job-
related crimes and to oversee the operations in state-owned
enterprises. 64 This solution may go a bit too far because candid
board discussion would be strangled with a prosecutor sitting in
the boardroom.
It seems that some Chinese listed corporations are confused
by the monitoring roles of independent directors. Many listed
corporations select technical experts as independent directors; one
survey shows that about 42.6% of independent directors are
technical experts.6' These technical experts may play an importantrole in drafting and advising business strategy plans, but they are
59. See id. at 60.
60. See id.
61. Huang, supra note 15.
62. Yian Deng, Du Li Dong Shi Bi Pin Du Li Jian Shi [Independent Directors
Compete with Independent Directors], FIN. & ECON. TIMES, available at
http://business.sohu.com/60/29/article200442960.shtml (Mar. 29, 2002).
63. Huang, supra note 15.
64. Id.
65. Lu, supra note 9.
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relatively weak in monitoring because many of them do not have
knowledge or experience in business operations.
Independent and non-independent directors play different
roles in the corporate governance structure. Any director will
perform one of three different functions: executive, instrumental,
and monitoring.66 Executive directors may be managers or other
insiders who can provide the board of directors with information
concerning the business situation of a corporation. Instrumental
directors may be a legal advisor, consultant, or financer, who is
instrumental in the decision-making and operation of a
corporation. Monitoring directors are outside directors who may
be public directors or experts whose main task is to carry out
independent supervision and examination of the performance of
61
the corporation.
In the United States, the central task of independent directors
is to monitor inside directors and management. 68 Technical experts
act as instrumental directors rather than monitoring directors.6 9
Currently, the primary role of independent directors in China is to
monitor the conflicts of interest in corporations. When selecting
independent directors, these corporations should keep in mind the
monitoring role of independent directors and choose directors who
are familiar with the business operations. The possibility cannot be
excluded that some controlling shareholders and insiders
intentionally choose technical experts, who would naturally speak
on technical issues rather than business matters. It is the job of the
regulators to further elaborate the roles and requirements of
independent directors.
The independent director institution has been in operation for
several years in China. As of June 2003, 1244 of 1250 corporations
listed in the two stock exchanges had independent directors on
their boards.7° Independent directors are now given more voice in
66. See Gu, supra note 1, at 61-62.
67. Lu, supra note 9.
68. See Ho, supra note 10, at 514-15; PRINCIPLES, supra note 29, at § 3A.01. See
generally Brudney, supra note 5 (arguing for the importance of regulatory controls in
corporate governance in view of the inadequacy of independent directors.); see generally
James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside
Directors with Independent Counsels, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2003).
69. See Gu, supra note 1, at 61.
70. Jian Lin, Zheng Jian Hui You Guan Fu Ze Ren Ti Chu Yi Si Da Cuo Shi Wan
Shan Du Dong Zhi Du [Head of CSRC Raises Four Issues to Improve the Independent
Director Institution], SHANGHAI SECURITIES DAILY (Feb. 6, 2004), at
http://finance.sina.com.cn/y/20040206/0722619309.shtml.
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corporate governance. For example, when two corporations listed
in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Kelong and Nanhuaxi submitted
their mid-term disclosures in 2002,71 all of the independent
directors chose to abstain when directors voted for the
72
corporation's financial reports. In contrast, in August 2003, at the
insistence of two of its independent directors, ST Nanhua-a
corporation listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange -successfully
removed the chairman of the board, an unprecedented move.
The regulators have met resistance in enforcing the Opinion from
China's listed corporations, which has a notoriously opaque
business culture.7 4 Thirty-six per cent of listed corporations missed
the deadline to fill at least a third of their board positions with
independent directors by June 2003."5 Even the CSRC admitted
that some of the listed corporations with independent directors
withheld negative information from them, in some cases even
refusing to invite them to board meetings.
6
Because the independent director institution has functioned
in China for only a relatively short amount of time, it is difficult to
access its effectiveness on China's corporate governance
environment. Many problems exist even though many people
favor this new institution. Yet, most independent directors do not,
or cannot, fulfill their monitoring role in corporate governance due
to the internal or external defects of the institution.
IV. CRITICISMS AND SUGGESTIONS
This Article criticizes the independent director institution on
the following: (1) true "independence" for independent directors
does not exist; (2) independent directors lack the information and
skill required to effectively function; and (3) independent directors
lack incentive to defy insiders and controlling shareholders.77
71. Yongli Sun, Du Li Dong Shi Zai Fa Yan [Independent Directors Are Raising
Voices], NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES TIMES (Jul. 5, 2002), at http://business.sohu.com
/07/87/article202008707.shtml.
72. Id.; see also Lei Wang, ST Nan Hua Du Dong Ban Dao Dong Shi Zhang [ST
Nanhua's Independent Directors Drove Away Chairman of Board], SECURITIES TIMES
(Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://www.p5w.net/p5w/home/stime/today/
200308220248.htm].
73.. Wang, supra note 72.
74. Bei Hu, Independents Shunned by China Firms, S. CHINA MORN. POST, Feb. 7,
2004, available at 2004 WL 55518220.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. See generally Brudney, supra note 5.
20051
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
A. Independence
The independence of independent directors is not absolute
and there is no universal test for independence. 8 The standards for
independence vary with the legislative needs to regulate corporate
governance structure.7 9 For example, in the United States, where
the major concern is independence from management, the NYSE
does not view significant stock ownership in itself as a bar to
determining whether a director is "independent., 80 Contrast this to
the Opinion in China, which requires that where the independent
director institution targets controlling shareholders, an
independent director shall not hold more than one percent of the
shares and shall not be affiliated with any controlling
shareholders. s
The apparent requirements on the independence of directors
resolve only part of the potential conflict of interest. Since the
purpose of the independent director institution is to safeguard the
whole interests of the corporation, the selection of independent
directors should be free from influence of controlling shareholders
or management. Some critics argue that in the American system,
"independence" exists only in theory because management
maintains significant control over the selection of directors. As one
scholar indicated, "no definition of independence yet offered
precludes an independent director from being a social friend of, or
a member of, the same clubs, associations, or charitable efforts as,
the persons whose [performance] he is asked to assess.,
82
Managers "can easily find directors who are neither subordinates,
relatives, nor suppliers, who will support almost anything that the
executives propose, and who will resign in extreme cases rather
than oppose the executives who have invited them to the. board.
83
Moreover, since studies show that the majority of outside directors
are themselves chief executive officers (CEOs), these "directors
are unlikely to monitor others more energetically than they believe
78. Id at 599.
79. Id. at 645.
80. See generally NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES § 303A, available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf (last visited Jul. 25, 2005). It is interesting
that Nasdaq tightened the criteria of independence by excluding large shareholders in
2002. Press Release, Nasdaq Takes New Actions on Corporate Governance Reforms (July
25, 2002), at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/2002.stm.
81. Gu, supra note 1, at 64.
82. Ho, supra note 10.
83. OLSON, supra note 7, at § 2:26.
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they should be monitored by their own boards., 84 While
independent nominating committees have been introduced to
ensure the independence of the director selection process, their
effectiveness has been criticized.85 The committee normally solicits
suggestions from the CEO as to potential candidates. Nominating
committees "may make the CEO work harder, but over time he
gets the board he wants.
''86
In China, besides management, independence means
independence from controlling shareholders. 7 In a country where
the relationship--known as guan xi, in both social and business
circles--is strongly emphasized, it is difficult for the selection
process of independent directors to avoid influence by controlling
shareholders or management. Although the Opinion provides
strict requirements for independence, true independence of
directors is difficult to achieve. There is no independent
nomination committee in listed corporations. Neither cumulative
voting nor withdrawal mechanisms have been adopted by Chinese
listed corporations. Article 4 of the Opinion provides that
independent directors are to be nominated by the incumbent
board of directors, the board of supervisors, or the shareholders
jointly or individually owning a one percent equity interest. In
reality, independent directors are solely selected by controlling
shareholders, either by themselves or through the board."
Controlling shareholders and management try to select those with
some connection to them and who will side with them.9° The CSRC
admitted that: "Many corporations' independent directors were
nominated by major shareholders or management. Such a
mechanism cannot guarantee the independence of the
appointees."'" Each year, the CSRC rejects some appointments of
independent directors because of various "under the table"
connections with controlling shareholders or management. 92 Last
84. Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 915 (1996).
85. Ho, supra note 10, at 519.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Guo, supra note 28, at 71.
89. Ho, supra note 10, at 520.
90. Lu, supra note 9.
91. Hu, supra note 74.
92. Ocean Net, Zhang Ji Zhong Jia Ping Wa Yao Ke Chuan Mou Gong Si Du Li
Dong Shi [Jizhong Zhang and Pingwa Jia Will Be Independent Directors of a Corporation]
(May 13, 2003), available at http://cn.ent.yahoo.com/030513/127/llx6q.html.
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year, an entertainment corporation based in Xi'An selected a
famous TV producer as its independent director. 93 When he was
questioned about his qualifications to be a director, the TV
producer frankly declared: "The manager is my good friend! "
94
To ensure true independence, the focus of regulation should
be on the procedure of selection and election of independent
directors. An independent nomination committee consisting of
entirely independent directors is in a better position, for the sake
of minority shareholders, to nominate candidates of independent
directors. To make the selection of independent directors free
from the influence of controlling shareholders, controlling
shareholders should not be allowed to nominate independent
directors, nor should they be allowed to vote for the independent
director candidates they nominated. In electing independent
directors, cumulative voting and withdrawal institutions could also
be adopted. After independent directors are elected onto the
board, constant monitoring is necessary. Regulatory institutions
such as the CSRS and the stock exchanges are effective but are
short of resources to monitor every listed corporate board. A
private cause of action may be given to shareholders, particularly
minority shareholders, to challenge the independence of
incumbent directors. Because independent directors represent
minority shareholders' interests, it is logical to give minority
shareholders the right to remove those independent directors
whom they no longer trust.
B. Incentive
The more independent a director is, the fewer incentives exist
for that director to maximize shareholder interest, and vice versa,
more incentive equals less independence.9 This "Catch-22" points
out an inherent dilemma of the independent director institution.
In the United States, critics claim that independent directors
lack adequate incentive for maximizing shareholder interests. 96 It is
well accepted that independent directors should be those who do
not derive the majority of their income from the corporation.97
Without financial gain, the only incentive for independent
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Ho, supra note 10, at 512.
96. Lu, supra note 9.
97. See generally Gu, supra note 1.
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directors to act is their professional reputation. But they can
always protect themselves by resigning from the board and
claiming innocence, due to management's withholding of
information. Who remembers the names of those sitting as
independent directors on the boards of Enron and Worldcom?
And how many of them are blamed for their failure to take action?
Moreover, the potential liability in relation to the benefits of
independent directors is too disproportionate for directors to be
anything but risk averse. Therefore, even where a director is truly
independent, active, and informed regarding corporate affairs,
prudent judgment often dictates that the director follow the course
of action endorsed by management. Incentives to veto the
management strategy rarely exist. One study suggests that "rather
than manage, boards react; they render advice when solicited and
replace the CEO only amid dire emergencies."98
In China, there is a striking range in the level of independent
director compensation; the average annual pay ranges from 1,000
RMB (about 121 USD) to more than 80,000 RMB (about 9,674
USD). 99 Most independent directors earn between 40,000 RMB
(about 4,838 USD) and 50,000 RMB (about 6,046 USD) a year.100
While some independent directors are volunteers without any
compensation, Zhenbaiwen-a corporation listed in the Shanghai
Stock Exchange-pays its independent directors a base
compensation of 120,000 RMB (about 14,510 USD) per year plus
additional compensation for each board meeting they attend in
that year.'0 ' Candidates for independent directors are sure to think
about economic incentives, in addition to professional ethics, in
weighing whether or not it is worth being an independent director
and in how they will perform their duties. If the compensation is
too low, independent directors lack economic incentives. If the
compensation is too high, the independence is eroded. The
Opinion prohibits a person from sitting as an independent director
on more than five listed corporate boards. Besides ensuring that
independent directors have enough time and energy, this
prohibition also prevents people from becoming "professional
98. OLSON, supra note 7, at § 2:26.
99. Lu, supra note 9.
100. Id.
101. Yongqiang Yi, PT Zheng Bai Wen (600898): Du Li Dong Shi Chou Xin Qi Zheng
Yi [PT Zhengbaiwen: The Independent Directors' Compensation Is Controversial],
NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES TIMES (June 25, 2002), available at http://business.sohu.com/
72152/artic1e201845272.shtml.
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independent directors," whose income may come primarily from
one or more listed corporations.
The flip side of compensation is liability. Establishing a
liability institution may, to a certain extent, discourage
independent directors from acting as "ornamental vases" and
make them truly fulfill their due roles. Liability, however, is a
double-edged sword. If the liability imposed on them is too high,
independent directors will tend to be conservative in executing
their responsibilities. For example, an independent director might
strike down all conflict of interest transactions to avoid risk. Many
people would be deterred from pursuing independent director
positions, and this would result in difficulty finding appropriate
candidates. Listing companies would in turn have to pay more for
suitable candidates. In 2002, Jiahao Lu, an independent director of
Zhengbaiwen, was fined 100,000 RMB (about 12,091 USD) by the
CSRC because he failed to take any action when the corporation
submitted a false accounting report.102 Lu subsequently sued the
CSRC for this decision, but the No. 1 Intermediate People's Court
of Beijing dismissed the lawsuit.0 3 Lu was the first independent
director punished in China. He is a retired professor with a
monthly income of only 1,500 RMB (about 181 USD). Lu had
received no compensation from Zhenbaiwen as its independent
director' Right after this incident, at least sixty-six independent
directors resigned from listed corporations. 105 Zhengbaiwen is now
paying over 14,000 USD to its independent directors, much more
than other listed corporations do. To avoid this result, an entirely
independent compensation committee should be established under
the board to decide the compensation of both directors and
management. It does not make sense for controlling shareholders
and management to decide the compensation of the very
102. Gu, supra note 1, at 70-71; see also Lu, supra note 9.
103. Zheng Bai Wen Yuan Dong Shi Zhuang Gao Zheng Jian Hui - Fa Yuan Bo Hui
Lu Jia Hao Su Zhuang [The Court Dismissed Jiahao Lu's Suit], LANZHOU MORNING
PAPER (Aug. 13, 2002), available at http://www.gansudaily.com.cn/20020813/501/
2002813A00502014.htm.
104. Zheng Bai Wen Yuan Dong Shi Lu Jia Hao Bu Fu Zheng Jian Hui Chu Fa An Kai
Ting [The Hearing Is Held Today Where the Ex-director Jiahao Lu Sues the CSRC], (June
20, 2002), available at http://www.chinanews.com.cn/2002-06-20/26/196639.html.
105. Chen Wenfang, Shang Ban Nian Du Li Dong Shi Li Zhi 37 Ren - Du Li Dong Shi
Bu Hao Dang Le [Thirty-Seven Independent Directors Leave Post in First Half of Year-It
Is Not Easy to Be an Independent Director], NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES TIMES, at
http://www.szs.com.cn/200208/ca159075.htm (last visited Jul. 25, 2005); The Hearing Is
Held Today Where the Ex-director Jiahao Lu Sues the CSRC (June 20, 2002), at
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/2002-06-20/26/196639.html.
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independent directors who monitor their performance. In terms of
the compensation method, equity compensation such as restricted
stock and stock options is more appropriate for independent
director compensation than cash.' ° Stock ownership may align
independent directors with shareholder interests and promote an
incentive to monitor.1 7 In China, independent directors are
designed to protect minority shareholder interests.' 8 Equity
ownership would put independent directors in the shoes of the
minority shareholder, which would give them a "shareholder
orientation" and "a genuine interest" in the corporation.0 9
The regulators should expand the scope of independent
director liability. Under the current Corporation Law of 1993, it is
unclear how much duty of care a director owes.110 In the Lu case,
the CSRC fined Lu based upon the Shares Issuance and Exchange
Regulation Ordinance (for Trial Implementation), an
administrative regulation. The ordinance was published in 1993
and a large part of it was superseded by the Securities Law of
1997.11 It is disputed whether the CSRC had jurisdiction over Lu
and whether the CSRC had power to impose such a big fine.'12
China's regulators should explicitly provide for independent
director liability in the corporation or securities laws. They should
also distinguish independent director and non-independent
director liabilities.
C. Ability
In the United States, many independent directors are no
match for insiders in terms of knowledge and purpose of the
corporation. Also, due to limitations of time and information, it is
very difficult for independent directors to monitor corporate
operations. Management has a virtual monopoly on information
and selectively reveals information to independent directors. It is
common for an independent board to be the last to know about
106. See Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate
Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 870 (2003).
107. Id. at 869-71.
108. Gu, supra note 1, at 70.
109. See Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board, to the Shareholders
of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 10 (Feb. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/ 20031tr.pdf.
110. See Gu, supra note 1, at 64-68.
111. See id. at n.16.
112. Id. at 70-71.
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any corporate difficulties. Agenda control by inside directors,
coupled with lack of time or expertise by independent directors,
adds up to the worst possible mix for frank discussions on the
board or decision-making as a board.' 3 These outsiders know little
about the actual business situation of their corporations and end
up observing problems from the perspective of management.
Independent directors cannot solve the problem of asymmetrical
information.
Certain boardroom norms exacerbate this disparity. For
example, "[independent] directors usually do not contact fellow
[independent] directors outside meetings, whereas inside directors
and the CEO are in constant communications with one another."
11 4
Consequently, "the chances of a majority of [independent]
directors acting together to oppose any management initiative or
even convey criticism are slim.""' 5 One commentator finds that,
"[s]ocial psychologists and management experts would dub these
meetings as very poor decision-making forums. The purpose of a
group discussion of an issue is to discuss diverse points of view
openly, and to confront and resolve differences of opinions. 11 6 As
Warren E. Buffett said, despite "the lapdog behavior" of
independent directors, they are not bad people but the boardroom
atmosphere "sedates their fiduciary genes."
In China, a large number of independent directors are
professors and scholars from universities. " 8 The problem here is
two-fold. First, these academics lack time as they concurrently
hold other full-time positions. Second, they do not necessarily
possess the knowledge and experience of a business operation.
Many of them are excellent in their respective fields but are not
familiar with the operations of listed corporations and do not
know how to act as a director." 9 However successful the
independent director may be in his own field, it is doubtful
whether the independent director has the ability to challenge
another equally successful person in an entirely different field.
Would a university president be competent to monitor the
113. Ho, supra note 10, at 512.
114. Id. at 512.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 513.
117. See Letter from Warren E. Buffett to the Shareholders, supra note 109, at 8.
118. According to the CSRC, about 42% of independent directors of listed
corporations are academics. Hu, supra note 74.
119. See id.
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management of a vertically integrated natural resources
corporation? This doubt cannot be dispelled. On questions of
probity, if auditors are nervous about their ability to detect fraud
when they have full access to the corporate books, how can an
independent director be expected to detect dishonesty hidden in
the neat and professionally turned-out documents presented to
him for board meetings?
Because China's modern corporate institution is so young, it
lacks experienced and qualified experts in business operations.
The CSRC has already begun to cooperate with institutions of
higher learning in offering training courses to independent
directors, indicating a trend towards allowing only those who have
received training to fill the posts of independent directors. This
might be a feasible way to improve the qualifications problem of
independent directors although the effectiveness of these short-
term training courses is limited. Since 2001, more than 1000 listed
corporations, unlisted public corporations, and fund managers
have been competing for approximately 10,000 graduates from
thirty training courses to serve as independent directors. 12' But not
all graduates have met other requirements for becoming an
independent director.21
Even assuming sufficient time and skills, independent
directors find it very hard to play their role in a board controlled
by a single dominating shareholder. The Opinion only requires
that one third of the board members be independent directors.
122
Insiders still dominate the other two thirds of the board seats. In
the United States, where outside directors prevail over inside
directors in number, insiders can still influence the board through
a variety of means. 123 How can we expect two or three independent
directors, a minority on the board, to fight against insiders? The
ratio of independent directors on the board is still too low. The
CSRC should require each listed corporation to have a majority of
independent directors. Entirely independent committees, such as
compensation and audit committees, should also be established
under the board. These independent directors will find it easier to
express dissenting opinions without the presence of controlling




123. Lu, supra note 9.
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Additionally, such independent directors, as members of a special
committee, can develop a solid base of knowledge by studying
specialized topics.
In summary, although the independent director institution is
politically correct, the nexus between directors and managers is
burdened with personal and financial entanglements. It is difficult
for independent directors to be effective monitors of management.
Director independence is a method for promoting good corporate
governance, but it does not ensure the most effective result.
Regardless, the independent director institution is a major step
towards improving the corporate governance structure in China. It
is unrealistic to expect independent directors to completely
prevent control by controlling shareholders and insiders when
listed corporations have not yet solved problems in their own
share structures, and China has yet to formulate a sound legal
institution.
V. A SPECIAL ISSUE: THE SUPERVISORY BOARD
The independent director institution is the legacy of common
law countries, where corporations are usually controlled by boards
of directors. In contrast, civil law countries, such as Germany and
France, have developed a supervisory board institution. China has
also adopted a model similar to that of civil law countries, where
the board of directors is under the supervision of a supervisory
board. Following the introduction of the independent director
institution, China is among the few nations which have established
both the independent director and supervisory board institutions.
Some commentators argue that it is more cost-effective to choose
between the two institutions because their oversight functions
overlap."' Under the existing corporate law in China, however, a
more effective way toward good corporate governance is to regard
the supervisory board as a supplementary institution, rather than
add the institution of independent director and to place all hope
upon it.1
21
In China, however, the supervisory board institution did not
function well from day one. Supervisory boards have quite
limited powers compared to their counterparts in Germany and
124. Lu, supra note 9.
125. See Gu, supra note 1, at 74.
126. See id.
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France." The supervisors in China are appointed by shareholders
and recommended by employees. Their supervisory role is not
"external[]" in nature. 28 Furthermore, under the current legal
structure, the supervisory board does not have any substantial
power. The board is unable to directly veto the decisions made by
the board of directors and management.1 29 As Gu states, "[f]or
example, when directors or managers have done something that is
not in their corporations' best interest, supervisors [can] only
demand that they remedy the harm."13 Furthermore, "[i]f this
demand does not work, supervisors [can] propose to hold an
interim shareholders' meeting and report the misconduct to
shareholders."'31 The proposal to hold an interim shareholders'
meeting, however, can be rejected, because the power to convene
an interim shareholders' meeting is vested in the board of
112directors. Moreover, Chinese supervisory boards do not have the
power to dismiss directors, unlike the supervisory boards in
Germany, 133 nor do they have the right to sue directors or
•134
management.
Most of the supervisory board members are trade union
presidents and employees' representatives. In China, trade unions
are not independent of corporations and not as powerful as their. • 131
counterparts in western countries. Instead, trade union
presidents are employees of corporations and their stature within
the corporation is low, while employee representatives are usually
136chosen from junior managers. It is doubtful that such a
127. Id. at 66-67.
128. See Co. L. OF THE P.R.C. (1993), art. 124, reprinted in LEGIS. AFFAIRS COMM'N
OF THE STANDING COMM. OF THE NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1993, at 296 (1995).
129. See id. art. 126 (3), at 296.
130. Gu, supra note 1, at 66.
131. Id.
132. See Co. L. OF THE P.R.C. (1993), arts. 47, 112, reprinted in LEGIS. AFFAIRS
COMM'N OF THE STANDING COMM. OF THE NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., THE LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1993, at 279, 293 (1995).
133. Gu, supra note 1, at 66.
134. Id.
135. See generally Lei Jiang, Min Jian Shi You Shang Hui Cheng Yuan Sheng Xian Xi -
Can Ye Ji Jin Ji Hua Shou Cuo [Disputes Arise Among Members of an Oil Trade Union -
Plan for Accumulating Industrial Investment Fund Is Set Back], FIN. & ECON. TIMES (Dec.
18, 2004), http://www.ce.cn/new-hgjj/guonei/cyjj/200412/18/t20041218_2610520.shtml.
136. See generally Dong Hu Gao Xin (600133) Jian Shi Hui Huan Jiai De Jue Yi Gong
Gao [Re-election Notice of the Supervisory Committee of Donghu Gaoxin], NEGOTIABLE
SECURITIES TIMES (Jan. 13, 2005), http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/shannounce/
20050113/09081291106.shtml.
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supervisory board could challenge the decisions made by the
boards of directors and senior management.
Since both the supervisory board and independent directors
serve as monitors, their role and function overlap, thereby
increasing the cost of corporate operation. Some commentators
thus argue that it is more cost-effective to choose between
independent directors and supervisors.'37
The CSRC also suggests that the supervisory board institution
will eventually be replaced by the independent director
institution. 138 However, the monitoring roles of independent
directors and supervisors are distinct. Independent directors
function during the decision-making process while supervisors play
their roles after the decisions have been made. Independent
directors work more closely with insiders while supervisors are
more akin to outsiders. The independent director institution can
co-exist with the supervisory board institution well if some
improvements are made.
First, supervisory boards should consist of only independent
supervisors. Only if supervisory boards maintain their
independence can they play the monitoring role effectively.
Second, the relevant laws and regulations should clearly state
the different powers and functions of supervisors and independent
directors. For example, the supervisory board should be given the
power to nominate independent directors. Supervisory boards
should also have the power to sue directors or management if
internal remedies are exhausted. The supervisory board institution
may be able to remedy or at least alleviate the defects of the
independent director institution. For example, to ensure the
independence and qualifications of independent directors,
independent supervisors should have the power to nominate or
even appoint independent directors. To maintain the incentive of
being an independent director, independent supervisors should
have the power to set the compensation level and bring actions
against independent directors if necessary. In this situation, the
additional supervisory board institution will be like "adding wings
to a tiger," and corporate governance will be substantially
perfected.
Therefore, an effective method to improve corporate
governance in China is to regard the supervisory board institution
137. Lu, supra note 9.
138. Guidelines for Introducing Directors, supra note 2.
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as a supplementary institution to the independent director
institution. Ignoring this important matter and shifting the
attention to the newly created independent director institution will
give people a false image that the new independent director
institution is a panacea to cure all the problems of corporate
governance. Chinese regulators are missing the lessons as they
hurry from creating one institution to another. Compared with the
supervisory board institution, the independent director institution
is not inherently better. The regulators need to get to the root of
the problems, which include the irrational share structure and
immature legal environment.
V. CONCLUSION
It is unrealistic to expect too much from independent
directors. How much can outsiders--who devote a total of perhaps
two weeks in a year to the corporation--uncover, particularly as
they are selected by and their information mainly comes from
controlling shareholders and the management whose performance
they are supposed to be monitoring. A basic presumption of the
independent director institution is that directors who keep some
distance from controlling shareholders and management are better
able to ask the right questions and evaluate the answers than those
who are closer to the corporation. So long as independent
directors do not actually manage the corporation, and so long as
they rely on insiders for their information, it is unrealistic to expect
that the independent director institution will necessarily lead to
dramatic improvements in corporate governance.
An independent director is an important part of the corporate
governance structure, but it does not complete it. To improve
corporate governance in China, the independent director
institution is only the first step. Also necessary are a fully
developed market economy, a sound legal institution, and a fair
judiciary, as well as a fine cultural environment for corporate
governance. It is unrealistic to expect the independent director
institution alone to solve all the corporate governance problems in
China.
At present, the overly concentrated shareholding structure in
listed corporations is one of the root causes of the corporate
governance problem. To address this issue, the key appears to be
eliminating, or at least decreasing, state ownership of listed
corporations. Chinese regulators should first try to alter the
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imbalanced shareholding structure and proscribe insiders (i.e.,
controlling shareholders and their agents) from exerting
disproportionate influences on the business of listed corporations.
They should also impose fiduciary duties on those people in
control. Only with this primary objective in mind can corporate
governance in China be approached in the right direction. Another
issue confronting listed corporate governance is the lack of
efficient and effective judicial intervention. Legal mechanisms,
such as derivative suits, appraisal rights, and class actions, are
often the last line of defense for the interests of investors. They
have undergone a long journey of development and have become
meaningful choices and powerful weapons for investors in western
countries. But they are still not viable options in China. It is
necessary to formulate a sound legal institution for the
independent director institution to work.
